West, the Global South and a Battle of Narratives

The geopolitical map is becoming increasingly complicated—and India appears determined not to read it like a school timetable.

One day, New Delhi is deepening strategic cooperation with the United States and its partners. On another, India sits at the same table as Russia, China and Iran in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. At the same time, it is speaking increasingly loudly about the concerns of developing countries and advocating a larger voice for the Global South.

This is not necessarily a contradiction.

It may actually be the central feature of India’s contemporary foreign policy.

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek offered a particularly revealing example.

The SCO moment: India signs, but India does not simply align

At the 26th SCO summit in Bishkek on August 31–September 1, 2026, Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined leaders of the organisation’s member states for discussions covering security, terrorism, regional stability, connectivity and economic cooperation. The summit adopted the Bishkek Declaration.

The declaration expressed deep concern about developments around Iran and condemned military strikes on Iranian territory, describing their consequences as a threat to international peace, security and stability. It called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

That is significant because the conflict involves the United States and Israel—countries with which India maintains important strategic and economic relationships.

But there is an important nuance.

India’s own position has consistently emphasised dialogue and diplomacy, rather than framing the issue as a simple contest between one geopolitical camp and another. At his meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the summit, Modi reiterated India’s concern over escalation and stressed that disputes should be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy. He also called for freedom of navigation and protection of civilians, commercial shipping and seafarers.

In other words, India’s signature on a multilateral document should not automatically be interpreted as India joining a geopolitical “anti-Western bloc.”

That distinction matters.

Strategic autonomy is becoming practical, not theoretical

For decades, India’s foreign-policy vocabulary has included the idea of strategic autonomy.

Today, it looks increasingly practical.

India can cooperate with Washington on technology, defence and the Indo-Pacific while maintaining relationships with Moscow for defence and energy. It can work with Iran on connectivity and regional issues while developing extensive economic ties with Gulf countries. It can participate in the SCO while also engaging deeply with Western-led institutions.

The logic is relatively straightforward:

India wants partnerships without permanent dependence.

That approach is sometimes described by analysts as strategic multi-engagement or “neo-strategic autonomy.” The objective is not to become equally close to everybody. That would be impossible.

It is to preserve enough diplomatic room to pursue India’s own interests.

And in a world of competing power centres, diplomatic room can itself become a strategic asset.

Why the Global South matters to India

India’s growing engagement with the Global South is not a new phenomenon.

The country has historical roots in the Non-Aligned Movement and South-South cooperation. But New Delhi has attempted to give the idea renewed institutional momentum, particularly through the Voice of Global South Summit, first hosted by India in 2023.

The argument is straightforward.

Many developing countries have limited influence over institutions created when the international balance of power looked very different from today.

India therefore increasingly presents itself as a country capable of carrying the concerns of developing economies into major global forums.

That includes issues such as development financing, food and energy security, climate change, technology access, healthcare and reform of international institutions.

India’s 2023 G20 presidency strengthened this image after the African Union was admitted as a permanent G20 member.

But there is a catch.

Leadership cannot be declared simply because a country calls itself a leader.

Countries in the Global South have different political systems, economic interests and relationships with the major powers.

Some are close to China.

Some are closely connected to the United States and Europe.

Some want Indian technology and investment.

Others have their own disagreements with New Delhi.

Independent analysis therefore suggests that India’s influence is real, but its ability to speak for the entire Global South has natural limits.

That is perhaps a healthier way of looking at India’s ambition.

India does not need every developing country to agree with it.

It needs enough countries to believe that India’s participation improves the conversation.

Humanitarian diplomacy: influence beyond speeches

There is another component to India’s expanding international role: humanitarian assistance.

India has increasingly sought to position itself as a rapid responder during disasters and humanitarian emergencies, particularly in its neighbourhood and across the wider Global South.

The Indian Council of World Affairs describes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as an increasingly important component of India’s international engagement and identifies India as an emerging first responder capable of providing material, logistical, medical and technical assistance.

This matters because geopolitical influence is not created only inside conference rooms.

Sometimes it begins with an aircraft carrying relief supplies.

Sometimes with a rescue team.

Sometimes with medicines.

And sometimes with a country discovering that another country arrived when it needed help.

That kind of diplomacy can create goodwill that no carefully written communiqué can manufacture.

Then comes the invisible battlefield

If traditional geopolitics is about territory, military power, trade routes and alliances, modern geopolitics has acquired another battlefield:

the smartphone screen.

Images, videos, memes, fake quotations, manipulated photographs and AI-generated material can travel around the world before journalists have finished checking the first sentence.

India is increasingly vulnerable to this environment simply because it is large, politically consequential and highly connected digitally.

Indian authorities have themselves acknowledged that deepfakes and misinformation pose serious threats to democratic institutions. During the 2026 India AI Impact Summit discussions, the Lok Sabha Speaker described deepfakes and misinformation as major challenges and stressed that AI should strengthen truth rather than distort it.

There are also reports and investigations alleging sustained misinformation campaigns targeting India through manipulated visuals, anonymous accounts and coordinated amplification networks. Such reports deserve attention—but their specific attribution and claims should always be independently verified before being presented as established fact.

That last sentence is not a minor journalistic footnote.

It is the entire point.

The danger of fighting misinformation with more misinformation

Here is where the story becomes slightly ironic.

A country can correctly identify a fake story about itself and still make a mistake by exaggerating who created it, why it was created or how coordinated it was.

“Someone posted a false video” is one claim.

“An organised foreign government operation created the video to stop India’s rise by 2047” is a much bigger claim.

The second requires much stronger evidence.

Otherwise, the fight against disinformation can itself become a new information problem.

The internet does not reward caution.

It rewards confidence.

Unfortunately, geopolitics is rarely that simple.

India’s biggest challenge: credibility

India’s rising influence therefore brings a new responsibility.

If New Delhi wants to be a credible voice for developing countries, it has to demonstrate that its foreign policy is driven by principles as well as interests.

That means supporting international law consistently.

It means condemning terrorism without double standards.

It means protecting civilians regardless of nationality.

It means defending freedom of navigation because India’s economy depends upon open trade.

And it means being willing to criticise actions by partners as well as rivals when the evidence warrants it.

This is difficult.

But credibility is often more valuable than applause.

DOONITED Editorial Perspective

India’s geopolitical opportunity today is not to replace one dominant bloc with another.

It is to become a bridge with bargaining power.

The Bishkek episode illustrates the complexity. India could sign an SCO declaration critical of military action against Iran while maintaining important relationships with the United States and Israel. It could engage Iran while protecting its interests with Gulf partners. It could advocate for the Global South while continuing to work with advanced economies.

That is not geopolitical confusion.

It is geopolitical management.

But there is a warning.

Strategic autonomy works only when a country has enough economic strength, technological capability, military credibility, diplomatic skill and domestic resilience to make independent choices.

The real measure of India’s rise, therefore, will not be how many summits it attends or how many countries praise its speeches.

It will be whether India can turn diplomatic flexibility into tangible outcomes—safer trade routes, stronger energy security, better technology access, greater influence in global institutions and meaningful development partnerships.

And perhaps the most important lesson for the public is this:

In the age of social media, the battle for a country’s global image is no longer fought only by diplomats.

Every viral post can become part of geopolitics.

Which means checking before sharing is no longer merely good digital manners.

It is, in a surprisingly small way, foreign policy.